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Message Text

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ACTION IO-13

INFO OCT-01 ARA-06 EUR-12 EA-07 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01

SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 ACDA-07 AID-05 OMB-01 TRSE-00

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R 011117Z SEP 76
FM AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2834
INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 PARAMARIBO 0780

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UNGA, NS, KS
SUBJ: SURINAM AND THE KOREAN ITEM IN THE UNGA

SUMMARY: WHILE MAJORITY OF OPINION IN SURINAM WOULD SIDE WITH SOUTH KOREA, THERE IS ENOUGH CONTRARY OPINION THAT SURINAM IS LIKELY TO ABSTAIN ON BOTH FRIENDLY AND UNFRIENDLY KOREAN RESOLUTIONS UNLESS CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE IS EXERTED. END SUMMARY.

1. ALTHOUGH KOREA IS ABOUT AS FAR FROM SURINAM AS A PROBLEM CAN BE, THERE ARE CERTAIN FACTORS WHICH WOULD PREDISPOSE THIS COUNTRY TO SUPPORT THE POSITION OF THE ROK. A NUMBER, PERHAPS AS MANY AS ONE TO TWO HUNDRED, SURINAMERS ARE SAID TO HAVE FOUGHT IN THE KOREAN WAR IN THE DUTCH ARMY. A LETTER FROM SUCH A VETERAN, RECENTLY PUBLISHED IN THE PRESS, INDICATES THAT TWO SURINAMERS LIE BURIED IN KOREA AND THAT AN ORGANIZATION EXISTS OF KOREAN WAR VETERANS, ALTHOUGH IT IS APPARENTLY COMPLETELY INACTIVE. SEVERAL HUNDRED SOUTH KOREAN FISHER-MEN WHO MAN SHRIMP BOATS IN THIS AREA ARE BASED IN SURINAM AND MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC LIFE HERE.
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THE ROK EMBASSY MAKES A DETERMINED EFFORT TO BRING KOREAN

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MATTERS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE WITH SOME SUCCESS. MOREOVER, SURINAM TENDS TO SHARE (WHERE IT DOES NOT HAVE CONTRARY INTERESTS OF ITS OWN) THE GENERAL FOREIGN POLICY VIEWS OF THE NETHERLANDS, WHICH IS, OF COURSE, ONE OF THE SPONSORS OF THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION. ALL OF THESE FACTORS WOULD TEND TO INCREASE THE PROBABILITY THAT SURINAM WOULD JOIN IN VOTING FOR THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION AND AGAINST THE UNFRIENDLY ONE.

2. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT, ALBEIT SMALL, SEGMENT OF POLITICAL OPINION WHICH IS DETERMINED TO BRING SURINAM INTO THE NON-ALIGNED-THIRD WORLD-GROUP OF 77 GROUP OF NATIONS AS AN ACTIVIST SOMEWHAT ALONG THE LINES OF NEIGHBORING GUYANA. THIS SEGMENT, HEADED BY MINISTER OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS BRUMA, HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF STRONG MOTIVATION AND AMPLE MODELS AVAILABLE IN THE AREA AND ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD. THIS GROUP WILL PUSH FOR SURINAM TO VOTE WITH THE NON-ALIGNED NATIONS AGAINST THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION AND FOR NORTH KOREA. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT THE NORTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN HAVANA MET WITH BRUMA DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO PARAMARIBO, ALTHOUGH IT MUST ALSO BE NOTED THAT HE WAS RECEIVED BY PRIME MINISTER ARRON AND THEIR PICTURE TOGETHER APPEARED IN THE PRESS.

3. IT IS CHARACTERISTIC OF THE GOS THAT NO DECISION WILL BE TAKEN IN ANY MATTER UNTIL IT BECOMES ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY AND EVEN THEN EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO AVOID OFFENDING ANY OTHER PARTY INTERNALLY OR ABROAD. WHEN (AND IF) SURINAM'S VOTE ON THE KOREAN ITEM IS ARGUED IN THE CABINET, THE MOST LIKELY RESULT WILL BE INSTRUCTIONS TO AMBASSADOR HEIDWEILER IN NEW YORK TO ABSENT HIMSELF FROM THE VOTE OR TO ABSTAIN. IT WILL TAKE A CONSIDERABLE EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE SPONSORS OF THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION TO CHANGE THIS SITUATION. A VOTE FOR THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION AND AGAINST THE UNFRIENDLY ONE IS PROBABLY TOO MUCH TO EXPECT. A REASONABLE GOAL OUGHT TO BE AN AFFIRMATIVE VOTE ON OUR SIDE AND AN ABSTENTION ON THE OTHER.

4. THE KOREAN EMBASSY IN PARAMARIBO (WHICH UNFORTUNATELY FOR PRESTIGE REASONS IS HEADED BY A CHARGE RATHER THAN AN CONFIDENTIAL

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AMBASSADOR) HAS BEEN WORKING VERY HARD ON THE GOS. THEY FREQUENTLY ARE ABLE TO SUPPLY THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WITH TEXTS SUCH AS THE SECRETARY'S SPEECH OR THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION WITHIN 12 HOURS AFTER THE EVENT, WHICH USUALLY MEANS FOUR OR FIVE DAYS BEFORE THIS EMBASSY GETS THE SAME MATERIAL. THE ROK CHARGE HAS ASKED THE GOS TO JOIN IN SPONSORING THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION. WE DOUBT THAT HE WILL GET ANYWHERE WITH THIS BUT HAVE NEVERTHELESS ENCOURAGED HIM TO MAKE THE APPROACH IN THE THOUGHT

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THAT A TURNDOWN ON THIS MIGHT INCREASE CHANCES OF AN
AFFIRMATIVE VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION ITSELF. THE ROK
EMBASSY JUDGES (A JUDGMENT SHARED BY US AND THE NETHERLANDS
EMBASSY) THAT GREAT CARE MUST BE TAKEN NOT TO PUSH TOO HARD
AND ENGENDER RESENTMENT, WHILE TRYING NEVERTHELESS TO MAKE
SURE THAT GOS HAS ALL OF THE FACTS AND UNDERSTANDS
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE.

5. THE NETHERLANDS EMBASSY (THE ONLY OTHER REPRESENTATIVE
OF A SPONSOR ALONG WITH US AND THE ROK) IS ANXIOUS TO AVOID
TAKING TOO HIGH A POSTURE ON THIS ISSUE. WHILE IT MIGHT
BE ASSUMED THAT THE DUTCH WOULD BE IN THE BEST POSITION TO
ADVISE THE SURINAMERS, THE FACT IS THAT THE DUTCH ARE SO
DEEPLY INVOLVED IN EVERYTHING HERE THAT THEY KNOW THAT THE
GOS IS RESENTFUL OF THIS RELATIONSHIP AND LIKELY TO REACT
ADVERSELY TO DUTCH PRESSURE ON KOREA. NEVERTHELESS, THE
DUTCH EMBASSY IS TAKING LOW-KEY OCCASIONS TO INVITE GOS
ATTENTION TO THE KOREAN PROBLEM AND THE VIRTUES OF SUPPORTING
THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION.

6. THIS EMBASSY HAS, OVER THE PAST FIVE MONTHS, MADE KOREA
A CONSTANT SUBJECT IN OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH GOS LEADERS.
WE HAVE SUPPLIED THEM WITH BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON KOREA
AND HAVE ENCOURAGED THEM TO STUDY THE HISTORY OF THIS ISSUE
SINCE 1945 IN ORDER TO GAIN PERSPECTIVE ON THE PROBLEM. IT
IS PROBABLY THAT THE PROFESSIONAL CIVIL SERVANTS WITH WHOM
WE DEAL WOULD SUPPORT THE U.S. POSITION. THE DIFFICULTY

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ACTION IO-13

INFO OCT-01 ARA-06 EUR-12 EA-07 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

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/098 W
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R 011117Z SEP 76
FM AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2835

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INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 PARAMARIBO 0780

LIES WITH THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WHO HAVE THEIR
DOMESTIC DIFFERENCES AS WELL AS THEIR VARYING VIEWS OF
THE WORLD. IN A CONVERSATION WITH THE DIRECTOR (NO. 2
MAN UNDER PRIME MINISTER-FOREIGN MINISTER ARRON) OF THE
MINISTRY FOR GENERAL AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE AMBASSADOR
REVIEWED THE COURSE OF THE KOREAN ITEM IN THE GA LAST
YEAR. HE NOTED THAT THE USG HAD CONSIDERED THIS ITEM
AMONG THE MOST IMPORTANT OF ITS INTERESTS LAST YEAR AND
THAT THE SAME WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE TRUE THIS FALL. THE
USG WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT ITS FRIENDS EXAMINE
THE KOREAN ITEM OBJECTIVELY AND REACH THEIR OWN CONCLUSION
AS TO THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION AS
A MEANS OF FURTHERING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION BETWEEN NORTH
AND SOUTH KOREA AND NOT BE SWAYED BY PARTISAN ATTEMPTS BY
"NON-ALIGNED" NATIONS TO GAIN SYMPATHY FOR WHAT IN REALITY
IS ONLY A NORTH KOREAN DESIRE TO GAIN CONTROL OVER THE
WHOLE PENINSULA. THESE ARGUMENTS ARE MEANINFUL TO THOUGHT-
FUL CIVIL SERVANTS, BUT, ULTIMATELY, THE POLITICAL DECISION
AS TO WHETHER THE USG REALLY CONSIDERS IT IMPORTANT HOW
SURINAM VOTES CAN ONLY BE INFLUENCED BY USG ACTIONS AT A
HIGHER LEVEL.
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7. TO BEGIN WITH, WE HOPE THAT FULL INSTRUCTIONS FOR A
DEMARCHE, EITHER ALONE OR IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE ROK AND
THE NETHERLANDS,WILL BE FORTHCOMING SOON IN THE NAME OF THE
SECRETARY TO BE CARRIED OUT VIS-A-VIS THE PRIME MINISTER.
FURTHER, WE ASSUME USUN AND THE COMMITTEE OF SPONSORS WILL
BE WORKING ON SURINAM AMBASSADOR HEIDWEILER IN NEW YORK.
THIS LATTER SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS A TECHNICAL AND INFORMA-
TIONAL OPERATION, HOWEVER, AS HEIDWEILER IS NOT THOUGHT TO
HAVE ANY SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL INFLUENCE ON THE GOS LEADERSHIP.

8. FURTHER DOWN THE LINE, A STRONG EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE DIRECTLY
WITH PRIME MINISTER ARRON WHEN HE COMES TO NEW YORK TO
DELIVER HIS OWN SPEECH IN THE FIRST HALF OF OCTOBER. NO
DATE HAS BEEN SET FOR THIS YET, BUT WE WILL NOTIFY THE DEPT
AND NEW YORK AS WELL AS SOON AS THE TIMING HAS BEEN DETERMINED.
IF ARRON IS THERE WHILE THE SECRETARY IS IN NEW YORK, THE
EMBASSY STRONGLY URGES THAT AN APPOINTMENT BE MADE FOR
HIM WITH THE SECRETARY. THE SINGLE MOST EFFICACIOUS MEANS
OF INFLUENCING THE SURINAM VOTE ON KOREA WILL BE A PERSONAL
EXPOSITION BY THE SECRETARY OF WHY THIS IS A MATTER OF

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PRIME IMPORTANCE FOR THE U.S. AND, AT LEAST BY IMPLICATION,
FOR US-SURINAM RELATIONS.
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